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France and Italy’s Policies on European Monetary Integration:
a  comparison of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states
Ivo Maes
Lucia QuagliaABSTRACT
This work compares France and Italy’s policies on European monetary
integration from the early 1970s arguing that the very different state structures
determined the different policies pursued towards European monetary
integration. France is a ‘strong’ state in terms of macroeconomic policy-making
in that it was able to coordinate the activities of national institutions in order to
produce coherent macroeconomic policies that were a crucial condition for
taking part in European monetary integration. Italy, in contrast, is characterised
by an ‘archipelago’ configuration with weak political capacity, which resulted in
less coherent and effective macroeconomic policies, thus challenging its
participation in European monetary agreements. State traditions also affected the
views of the respective countries on European integration with French policy
makers largely in favour of an intergovernmental approach and Italian policy
makers supporting a supranational one. Overall, whereas it was politically
problematic for France to accept the principles of a supranational Economic and
Monetary Union as well as central bank independence, the main obstacle for
Italy was to achieve economic convergence.
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In the literature on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), only a handful of
works in both political science and economics, and even less in an
interdisciplinary perspective, have compared and contrasted the experience of
various member states in the process of European monetary integration
(cf Talani 2000; Verdun 2000). The works that have covered more than one
country have treated them mainly as individual country studies (e.g Dyson and
Featherstone 1999) or have focused on one specific aspect, such as exchange
rate policy (Onofri and Tommasini 1992; Oatley 2000; Walsh 2000). This paper,
instead, compares France and Italy’s policies on European monetary integration,
arguing that such a comparison not only generates new insights into the process
of European monetary integration, but also elucidates the importance of state
structures in shaping EMU policies.
France and Italy, founding members of the EU, are comparable in terms
of economic, geographic and demographic size. Both countries enjoyed
relatively stable and supportive attitudes towards European integration among
the elite and also more widely in public opinion. Economic interests did not
have a major impact on shaping the member states’ EMU policies, which were
largely the domain of national ‘core executives’ composed of government
officials and central bankers (Dyson and Featherstone 1999, Quaglia 2002).
The two countries’ state structures and conceptions, however, differed
remarkably in that France presents a clear example of a ‘strong state’ in terms of
macroeconomic policy-making and is also one of the oldest nation states in
Europe, whereas Italy is traditionally portrayed as a ‘weak state’ that dates its
existence only back to the second half of the 19
th century. This work argues that
these state structures determined France and Italy’s policies towards European
monetary integration to a large extent. Given the centralisation of the French
state, it was easier for national authorities to instil discipline into the economy, a
crucial condition for progress towards European monetary integration. On the
contrary, EMU in Italy was more often than not seen as a way to ‘import’
macroeconomic discipline.
The different state conceptualisations also resulted in different
conceptions of European integration with intergovernmentalism favoured in
France and supranationalism favoured in Italy. For French policy-makers the
international dimension of EMU was paramount, as European monetary
integration was seen as a way of strengthening the French position compared to
the United States and Germany, whereas for Italian policy makers, it was more a
means to implement domestic reforms. Indeed, whereas the problem for Italy in
deciding to take part in EMU was mainly the country’s economic performance,2
for France, it was politically problematic to accept the principles of a
supranational EMU as well as central bank independence.
France has of course been a more powerful actor in the European Union
(EU) system than Italy, among other reasons because the Franco-German
partnership has traditionally been regarded as the ‘engine’ of European
integration. Thus, the Franco-Italian EMU relationship has been ambivalent:
while the Franco-German relationship has been crucial for the French, France’s
relationship with Italy largely stemmed from it.
The period covered in this study spans from the Hague Summit of
December 1969, when EMU came on the agenda, to the selection of the
participants in 1998. The paper starts with an analysis of French and Italian
macroeconomic policy-making institutions. It then moves on to the
macroeconomic policy strategies of the two countries and the key concepts for
EMU. Neither the Franco-Italian relationship, nor the broader EU dynamic in
which their policies were embedded, are discussed in the paper. An overview of
the process of European monetary integration is given in Table  2, which
highlights history-making events in European monetary integration as well as
the main positions taken by both countries.
This paper draws on the authors’ earlier research on the French and
Italian approaches towards EMU (see especially Maes 2002a, Maes 2002b and
Quaglia 2002). This research utilises a wide variety of sources, which
differentiates it from previous research in the field in that it relies on primary
documents, archival sources, and a wide range of interviews, as well as the
experience of one of the authors in the policy-making process. The focus is on
official positions, even if attention is sometimes given to certain influential
French and Italian individuals.
1
2.  STATE STRUCTURE AND POLICY-MAKING INSTITUTIONS
This section focuses on state structures in France and Italy, paying particular
attention to domestic institutions involved in the conduct of macroeconomic
policies. A preliminary point to bear in mind is that, whereas France underwent
major systemic changes with the end of the Fourth Republic in 1958, significant
institutional changes did not take place in Italy until the 1990s.
The terms ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ state are generally used to characterise the
relationship between state and society in national economies, in particular the
                                                    
1 Even the issue of what is an official position is not fully clear (see, for example,
Wallace,  2001, who focuses on governments).  In this paper ‘official positions’ refers
mostly to governments (especially the ministry of finance), but also to the central banks.
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degree to which the state is willing and able to intervene in the economy as well
as the degree of state autonomy from society and bureaucratic influence
(Katzenstein 1977). These terms are used in this work in reference to
macroeconomic policy-making in order to describe the configuration of the state
and political capacity, or the lack of it, to coordinate the activities of various
macroeconomic institutions and to produce coherent economic policies.
2.1  France
France has a long tradition as a strong centralized state. As remarked by
Rosanvallon (1992, 64), the ‘State’ preceded the nation in France and gave
France a coherence and an identity
2. The Revolution of 1789 abolished the
monarchy and reduced the role of religion placing ‘Reason’ at the center of
French society.  This further reinforced the role of the state in French society
3. It
gave birth to ‘la tradition républicaine’, focused on the ‘one and indivisible’
republic, a view which would permeate France.  Fundamental to the republican
state was the primacy attached to the sovereign nation as the source of
legitimacy. The task of the state was to ensure the unity of public power in the
service of the nation
4.
An important element of the French state was the creation of a strong
national elite, formed in the ‘Grandes Ecoles’ ( Ecole Polytechnique,  Ecole
Nationale de l'Administration). The graduates of these ‘Grandes Ecoles’ move
quite easily between the public and the private sectors, which also assumes that,
broadly speaking, the private sector is relatively responsive to the policies
followed by public authorities.
With the Fifth Republic, France became a presidential republic in which
the president is elected directly by citizens. The head of state enjoys a strong
leadership role in line with the Napoleonic and centralist traditions. Although in
periods of cohabitation, when the president and the government belong to
different parties, presidential powers are curtailed, with the president
maintaining responsibility for foreign affairs and EU issues.
                                                    
2 According to legal experts, the French civil law system was designed to be an instrument
of power of the state.  This contrasts with the Anglo-Saxon civil law system where the
protection of citizens against the government is at the core.
3 So the state took on an important role in education, which in France is called ‘éducation
nationale’.
4  It went together with a French emphasis on institutions, something which was typical of
Monnet's approach to European integration: “Rien n'est possible sans les hommes, rien
n'est durable sans les institutions" (Monnet, 1976, 412.  See also Fontaine, 1990, 19 or
Duchêne, 1994, 401).4
The ‘tradition républicaine’ also stressed the political direction of policy
(Howarth,  1999).  It implied the primacy of political will on the markets.
Economic policy had a strongly ‘voluntarist’ element. The republican tradition
also legitimated a centralisation of power  in economic and monetary matters.
The executive ultimately was responsible for macroeconomic policies while the
influence of the legislature was limited. Furthermore, this often went together
with a protectionist approach with Colbertism.
The ‘Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances, et de l'Industrie’, including
the Treasury, had a very prominent status within the French administration. The
Treasury was responsible for the conduct of monetary policy, while the Banque
de France was traditionally considered a part of the ‘circuit du Trésor’, a far cry
from an independent central bank. The autonomy and authority of the French
central bank increased during the 1980s. With the growth of financial markets,
the position of the Banque de France vis-à-vis the Treasury was strengthened,
due to its technical expertise and its knowledge and experience of the markets.
2.2  Italy
Italy has traditionally been portrayed as a ‘weak’ state (Ranci 1987) with a
porous structure and a dispersed and poorly co-ordinated set of institutions
(Della Sala 1997). Admittedly, the country underwent significant changes
during the 1990s affecting the electoral and political party system as well as the
institutions dealing with macroeconomic polices. Even so, the main features of
the governance structure identified below have not been fundamentally altered.
The executive had limited powers vis-à-vis the legislative and the Prime
Minister’s position within the executive was also relatively weak compared with
France. Thus, the formal and substantial powers of the Prime Minister and the
executive in macroeconomic policy-making, as well as in other policy areas,
were quite limited and mainly rested on the Prime Minister’s function as arbiter
between domestic forces (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). The archipelago
institutional structure also meant that a multitude of economic ministries were
involved in macroeconomic policy-making in various ways – a typical example
of Italian ‘fragmentation’. For example, three main ministries dealt with
macroeconomic policies, namely, the Ministry of the Treasury; the Ministry of
the Budget and Economic Planning; and the Ministry of Finance. Amongst
them, the Treasury was de facto the most influential. As part of a wider set of
reforms implemented in Italy in the late 1990s, the three economic ministries
were merged and reorganised (Quaglia 2002). The institutional positions and
powers of the Prime Minister as well as of the Treasury Minister were also
strengthened (Della Sala 1997).
5
The Italian central bank has always had a special position in Italy and is
highly respected domestically and internationally. First, the Bank of Italy
secured stability and continuity in the volatile Italian environment with a high
turnover of governments, even if substantial changes in the composition of the
government majority and political personnel were more limited.
5
Second, the Bank is a monolithic institution within which the governor
has a very powerful position representing the Bank de jure and de facto and
being personally responsible for central bank policy (Eizenga 1993: 13). This
contrasted neatly with the weakness of the executive and its strong
subordination to the legislature, at least for most of the period considered here.
Third, an important factor in explaining the Bank’s central role is that all too
often Italy attempted to manage its economy largely by means of monetary
policy alone (Posner 1977). Yet, in the 1970s the Bank had to ‘accommodate’
the Treasury’s financial needs by monetising the public deficit, that is, issuing
currency to finance budgetary imbalances (Fratianni and Spinelli 1997)
6. With
the so called ‘divorce’ between the Bank of Italy and the Treasury in 1981 the
former was freed from the obligation to buy unsold treasury bonds, therefore
acquiring greater independence from the fiscal authorities (Fratianni and Spinelli
1997; Goodman 1992). During the 1980s the Bank’s ‘economic independence’
7
was de facto strengthened by the parallel development of the domestic financial
market and the liberalisation of capital movements, for both processes facilitated
the placement of government bonds in the market (Carli 1993).
Last but not least, as far as strong and weak states are concerned, it is
important to remember that in the 1970s the Italian state was threatened by
internal terrorism. Nothing on a comparable scale happened in France. This
could not but affect policy-makers’ choices in the macroeconomic field (Carli
1993) as shown by the ‘monetary compliance’ of the Bank in financing the
public deficit. Also, although corruption scandals broke out both in France and
in Italy during the 1990s, they had more far-reaching consequences in Italy.
                                                    
5 In the postwar period Italy had more than fifty governments but only five governors of the
Banca d'Italia.
6 In 1975 Carli managed to open the auction of Treasury bonds thereby creating a private
market for public bonds and defeating the ‘corporatist attitudes’ of the banking system
(Carli 1993), which had blocked this reform in 1962. Some authors (e.g. Sarcinelli 1995;
see also Repubblica, 26 July 1991, interview) argue that the price paid for this was a
resolution of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Credit and Saving which compelled the
Bank of Italy to act as the residual buyer of all unsold treasury bonds.
7 Some literature on central banks distinguishes between economic independence and
political independence see Grilli et al (1991). However, one should be aware that such a
classification is not uncontroversial and other typologies have been used, such as ‘goal
independence’ and ‘instrument independence’.6
2.3  Comparison
The main difference between the French and Italian macroeconomic policy-
making structures is that whereas France is a strong state with a hierarchic and
monolithic configuration, Italy is a weaker state characterised by a more fragile
and disjointed structure. These institutional features are very important in
explaining why France, under a strong leadership, managed to shift its
macroeconomic policies rather swiftly and convincingly in the 1980s, whereas a
major breakthrough only occurred in Italy during the 1990s. Secondly, different
domestic institutions made it possible for the Italian central bank to have a major
input into charting Italy’s policy on European monetary integration, albeit more
during some periods, such as the 1980s, than during others, such as the 1970s
and 1990s. In France,  in contrast, the executive was generally more involved.
3.  MACROECONOMIC POLICY STRATEGIES
3.1  France
There was generally a very high degree of coherence in economic policies in
France: budgetary policy, monetary and exchange rate policy, as well as
incomes policies were usually consistent with one another, which is not
surprising given the configuration of the national policy-making structure in
France.
It is however less easy to distinguish clear tendencies or schools of
thought with respect to French macroeconomic and monetary policy (Maes
2002b). One could argue that there was a tension between two approaches: one
focusing on domestic policy priorities, especially economic growth, and taking a
more relaxed view of the exchange rate, and the other advocating ‘discipline’
and favouring a stable (or strong) French franc. The first tendency, focusing on
domestic policy objectives, was more in line with the traditional French
‘voluntarist’ approach. It drew support from different quarters, both in socialist
and gaullist milieu, as well as among employers and trade unions. The main
objective of economic policy was to strengthen economic activity, even at the
cost of a higher inflation rate. Ensuing competitiveness problems were mainly
tackled by devaluations of the franc. This line of thought was dominant during
the Pompidou presidency (1969-1974), the Chirac prime ministership (1974-
1976) and the first years of the Mitterrand presidency (1981-1983), and could
draw support from more Keynesian and left-wing economists. On the other hand
there was the more ‘orthodox’ line emphasising discipline: a strong French
franc, wage moderation and sound public finances. This line of thought
7
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dominated French policy-making during the Barre prime ministership (1976-
1981) and also after Mitterrand's decision to stay in the EMS in March 1983,
traditionally, finding more support with liberal, free market-oriented economists.
This ‘orthodox’ line was, generally, also the more pro-European line. The EMS
was created during the Barre prime ministership. For Mitterrand, his European
convictions were crucial to his decisions to stay in the EMS. Generally speaking,
the European constraint was influential in pushing through more orthodox
economic policies, while a strong franc (with sound fundamentals) was
considered important in order to be a strong and solid partner in the European
debate.
The oil shock of 1973 and the ensuing stagflation were of fundamental
importance in inducing changes in French economic policy-makers’
conceptions. Both events very clearly showed the openness of the French
economy and its vulnerability to external developments (Patat 1992: 8). The oil
shock was also a more or less fatal blow to the French planning experience.
French policy-makers became more and more aware that there were limits to
activist policies and that France had to take  external constraints more into
account.
During the second half of the 1970s, under Raymond  Barre’s prime
ministership, French economic policies became more stability-oriented (Albert
1982: 115)
8. The exchange rate was a crucial element in the strategy designed to
instil discipline into the French economy. Barre also pushed through measures to
liberalise prices.  This reorientation of French economic policy was an important
reason why German policy-makers consented to the creation of the EMS.
Mitterrand's initial economic policies could then be considered to be a last gasp




In Italy, contrary to France, there was less unity and coherence between the
various macroeconomic policies for the period from the 1970s to the 1980s
namely, in the areas of fiscal policy, monetary and exchange rate policy and
incomes policy (Rossi 1998). Furthermore, given the weak political capacity and
fragmentation of economic policy responsibilities, there were often divergencies
                                                    
8  Raymond Barre was originally a prominent academic and scholar.  As a Vice President of
the European Commission from 1967 to 1972 he had first hand knowledge of differences
between the French and German economic policy conceptions (Barre 2000: 19).
9  For an analysis of the early years of the Mitterrand presidency based on the Archives of the
Presidency see Feiertag, 2001 and Saunier 2002.
9
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and inconsistencies between the various policies (cf. Onofri and Tomasini 1992:
88). On the one hand, an important factor in Italy’s macroeconomic policy
strategy during the 1970s and 1980s was the attempt to manage the economy
largely through monetary policy – often referred to as the ‘function of
substitution’ performed by the central bank. On the other hand, Italy did not
embark on major fiscal adjustment until the 1990s, starting with the Amato
government in 1992, when the reform of incomes policy was also completed.
Furthermore, in the Italian case, in contrast to the French, it is more difficult to
identify predominating lines of economic thought and major shifts in
macroeconomic policy.
As in France, one can contrast the advocates of ‘discipline’ with those in
favour of ‘activist’ policies (or in the case of Italy, ‘laxist’ policies may be a
better description). In Italy, as opposed to France, the role of the exchange rate
as an instrument of economic policy was much debated. Indeed, in an export-
oriented and modernising economy, such as Italy was in the 1970s, the balance
of payments position and the level of the exchange rate were at the centre of the
monetary authorities’ attention (Hodgman and Resek 1983).
In the 1960s, Italian authorities supported the Bretton Woods fixed
exchange rate system, whereas, by the end of the decade, they acknowledged
that the system had become a source of instability. In 1970, for instance, Guido
Carli, governor of the Bank of Italy (1960-75), argued in favour of flexible
exchange rates between the US and Europe. He further favoured frequent and
small parity changes within the EC area, given the remarkable differences in the
national levels of inflation among EC countries (Carli 1970: 5). During that
period, Treasury Minister Colombo was also in favour of a crawling peg.
In the 1970s, the Italian monetary authorities’ response to the supply
shocks was a blend of supply side measures, mainly subsidies to enterprises,
inflation and exchange rate depreciation (Giavazzi and Spaventa 1989). The
priority was to safeguard industry’s profitability and investment. A ‘flexibilist’
approach to exchange rate policy can also be found in the negotiating position of
certain Italian economic policy-makers, such as Governor Baffi, during the
setting up of the EMS (Ludlow 1982).
In the 1980s, the Italian monetary authorities supported a (relatively)
‘hard currency’ option for Italy, maintaining that the exchange rate could be
deployed as an ‘external constraint’ in the domestic arena to fight inflation by
disciplining the trade unions and promoting industrial restructuring. The high
interest rates resulting from the tight monetary policy which was needed – or so
the argument went – to defend the lira exchange rate parity within the Exchange
11
















Rate Mechanism (ERM), thereby avoiding politically costly devaluations, was
also used in an attempt to trigger restrictive fiscal policy. A major turning point
in the conduct of Italian exchange rate policy was the creation of the EMS in
1979 and the appointment of Ciampi as Governor at the Bank of Italy shortly
thereafter.
10 In the first half of the 1980s the small and frequent lira re-
alignments that took place within the ERM never fully compensated for the
inflation differentials between Italy and the low inflation countries within the
system (Bini-Smaghi and Vona 1988). Furthermore, from 1987 to 1992, no re-
alignments took place within the ERM, and by the end of that period the lira was
strongly overvalued in real terms. Eventually, the lira had to be withdrawn from
the ERM during the currency crisis of September 1992 and floated outside the
system until the end of 1996.
The different approaches to exchange rate policy tended to coincide with
different views on the Italian economy. The ‘pessimist’ view was sceptical of
the reaction capacity of the Italian economy on the ground that externally
imposed discipline was useless, if not counter-productive, if domestic discipline
was lacking. The optimistic view, by contrast, maintained that the EMS was a
welcome external constraint that the Italian economy could stand, taking
advantage of it to sustain the process of disinflation.
3.3  Comparison
There were significant differences in macroeconomic policy and performance
between France and Italy. First, there were major differences in budgetary
policy. In France, generally, the deficit was reasonably under control.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the deficit rarely surpassed 3%. This contrasted
with major deficits in Italy exceeding 10% for several years.
                                                    
10  It should however be mentioned that several concurrent domestic and international changes
occurred during that period. In 1981 the so-called ‘divorce’ increased the autonomy of the
Bank of Italy in the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policy. Internationally, the US
Federal Reserve tightened its monetary policy.
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Divorce Bank of Italy-Treasury
1983 Mitterrand president
- Decision to stay in the EMS
- Politique de rigueur
1983-1985 Craxi government
Reform of incomes policy (reduction of the
wage indexation mechanism)
1992 Amato government
- Reform of incomes policy (wage
indexation mechanism abolished)
- Fiscal adjustment started
- Lira withdrawal from the ERM
1996 Prodi government
- Lira re-entry in the ERM
- Public deficit less than 3%
Second, in the 1970s, wage-indexation was important in both countries, even
though it was more extensive in Italy. In France, it was abolished by the Mauroy
government in 1983. In Italy, the reform started under the Craxi government in
1985 was completed by the Amato government in 1992.
Third, there were important differences in exchange rate policies. France
and Italy were both founding members of the Snake
11 in April 1972. However,
Italy withdrew as early as February 1973. France withdrew in January 1974,
rejoined the Snake in July 1975, and then withdrew again in March 1976. Both
countries joined the ERM from the very beginning in March 1979, but Italy
applied a wider fluctuation band (of 6%) and gave more ground during
realignments
12. Furthermore, in September 1992, Italy had to withdraw from the
ERM and rejoined it only in 1996.
                                                    
11 The snake in the tunnel, which entered into force in April 1972, was a mechanism for the
managed floating of EEC currencies (the ‘snake’) within narrow margins of fluctuation
against the dollar (the ‘tunnel’).





























































































REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES OF THE FRENCH FRANC 
AND THE ITALIAN LIRA
(index 1979=100, against 25 countries)
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Fourth, from the early 1970s to the late 1990s, Italy had a consistently higher
inflation rate than France, a clear indication of more ‘laxist’ economic policies.
Its lack of coherence in economic policy and its difference with France comes
clearly to the foreground when one looks at indicators of competitiveness.
Taking 1979, the year of the creation of the EMS, as a starting point, the
competitiveness of the Italian economy increasingly deteriorated, measured both
by the evolution of consumer prices and by unit labour costs in the
manufacturing sector. It is an indication that budgetary policy and incomes
policy were not in accordance with exchange rate policy, in contrast to the
French situation.  In the summer of 1992 when the ‘europhoria’ on the financial
markets ended, the Italian lira was forced out of the ERM.
13
These differences in macroeconomic policy and performance can largely be
traced to the very different state structures in France and Italy. Given the tenu
d’ensemble of the institutions involved, it was easier for French policy-makers
to impose discipline on the French economy. In Italy, with its ‘archipelagic’
state structure and weak political capacity, macroeconomic policy was less
coherent and therefore less effective in imposing discipline.
4.  KEY CONCEPTS FOR EMU
4.1  France
4.1.1 European monetary identity and power motives
French interest in European monetary integration can, in the first instance, be
situated within discussions concerning the future of the international monetary
system (de  Lattre 1999). De Gaulle had always been critical of the central
position of the American dollar in the Bretton-Woods system. During the second
half of the 1960s, French officials, in order to attain a more equilibrated
international monetary system, developed ideas about a ‘European monetary
identity’ (Haberer 1981). However, this concept remained rather vague.
Elements included a type of exchange rate mechanism in order to keep European
currencies closer together and a common Community position in international
institutions like the IMF
14. Subsequently, power motives remained a cornerstone
of the French attitude to European monetary integration. For instance, after the
decision of March 1983 to opt for the EMS, France remained unhappy with the
dominant German position within the system. During Franco-German
                                                    
13 The literature on the ERM crisis is vast. See Buiter et al. (1998); Gros and Thygesen
(1998).
14  This contrasted with German analyses of the Bretton-Woods system, which focused on the
threat that intervention obligations posed for their domestic objective of price stability
(Emminger 1977: 53).16
negotiations, Jacques Attali even called the German mark the ‘force de frappe
allemande’.
4.1.2 The primacy of national sovereignty and opposition to supranational
arrangements
Because of the republican tradition, which emphasises the ‘one and indivisible’
state, French policy-makers were generally more reluctant to transfer
sovereignty to the European level. Supranational institutions, such as the
European Commission and the European Court ofJustice, did not enjoy much
support from French authorities and this was reflected by the intergovernmental
approach and support for ad hoc cooperation that they traditionally adopted on
EU matters.
15 For example, immediately after its publication, the Werner
Report
16 was heavily criticised by the orthodox gaullists in France (Tsoukalis
1977: 104). Their criticism centred on the supranational elements of the Report.
It induced a change in the policy of the French government, contributing to a
dilution of the proposals of the Report
17. In particular, the creation of new
Community institutions was dropped.
4.1.3 A monetarist emphasis
France was a dominant player in the ‘monetarist’ camp, favouring greater
exchange rate stability and exchange rate support mechanisms. A blueprint can
be found in the so-called Fourcade plan of September 16,  1974. Jean-Pierre
Fourcade, the French finance minister, presented a communication on new
initiatives in the monetary field. One of the main points was a change in the
institutional framework of the Community exchange rate mechanism. The snake
would continue to exist, but would be complemented by a ‘welcoming mat’ for
the other Community currencies (Fourcade 1974: 22). This could be done by
allowing European currency rates to fluctuate according to reference rates,
which could be adjusted and temporarily suspended. The reference rates and
fluctuation margins would be defined in relation to a new European monetary
unit of account, that would be derived from a basket of various European
currencies. So, as some observers noted, the Fourcade plan would create ‘a kind
                                                    
15 In the past there has been a relatively high degree of support for European integration in
France. This trend peaked in the 1980s, when it reached 70%, and followed a declining
trend throughout the following decade bottoming,by the end of the 1990s, at 50% or less.
Yet, in the late 1990s the support for the single currency was still above 60%
(Eurobarometer 2000).
16 In December 1969 the European Council decided to make EMU an official goal of the
community and appointed a high-level group chaired by Pierre Werner, Prime Minister of
Luxembourg, with the task of drawing up a report on how EMU was to be reached by
1980. Other members of the committee were the chairperson of various EC committees.
17 For an analysis of the attitude of Pompidou towards EMU (see Bernard 1999).
17
of boa around the snake’ (van Ypersele and Koeune 1985: 44). Moreover, it was
intended that the use of the European unit of account would contribute to a more
symmetrical system. In the snake, the intervention obligations were formally
symmetrical. However, as the loss of reserves constitutes a more effective
constraint on a weak currency country, the burden of adjustment falls, de facto,
on the weak currency country. The Fourcade plan also provided for a
consolidation and extension of intra-Community credit mechanisms.
Later, in January 1988, the French Finance Minister, Edouard Balladur,
argued that the exchange rate mechanism still had some important defects,
notably its asymmetry.  Balladur criticized the German dominance of the
system: ‘Il faut éviter qu'un seul pays ait, de fait, la responsabilité de fixer les
objectifs de politique économique et monétaire de l'ensemble du système’
(Balladur 1988: 19).
4.1.4 Central bank independence and a ‘gouvernement économique’
The concept of central bank independence proved to be particularly awkward
and difficult to accept for French policy-makers. It came on the agenda with the
Delors Report in 1989.
18  This proposed, at the institutional level, the creation of
an independent ‘European System of Central Banks’, which would be
responsible for the single monetary policy, with price stability as the ultimate
aim.  In the discussions on the independence of the central bank, one of the most
delicate issues, Pöhl received valuable support from de Larosière, for whom the
Delors Committee also presented an opportunity to increase the independence of
the Banque de France (Dyson and Featherstone 1999: 345)
19.
Central bank independence, and the lack of political control over
monetary policy, would remain a sensitive topic in France. Mitterrand claimed,
misleadingly, during a television debate before the French referendum on the
Maastricht Treaty, that elected officials would establish the economic policy
framework for monetary policy. Even after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty,
                                                    
18 The Hanover European Council in 1988 appointed the Committee for the Study of
Economic and Monetary Union, the so-called Delors Committee. The committee received
the mandate ‘to study and propose concrete stages leading to the progressive realisation of
economic and monetary union’ (Delors Committee Report 1989: 43). The composition of
the Committee included the central bank governors of the then twelve member states, the
President of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors, the Commissioner in charge of External
Relations, and three independent experts. All of the members served in their personal
capacity. The report laid out a blueprint for EMU, and many of these provisions were
included in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992.
19 In order to cover himself politically de Larosière had a meeting with Mitterrand in which
Mitterrand did not object to central bank independence.18
Christian Noyer, then at the French Treasury, wrote about central bank
independence as ‘l'exception au principe démocratique’ (Noyer, 1992, 17).
When it became clear that an independent central bank was inevitable,
Bérégovoy and Treasury officials introduced the idea of a ‘gouvernement
économique’.  It implied a form of political counterweight at the European level
to the European Central Bank’s control over monetary policy (Howarth 2001).
The French draft treaty notes: ‘Everywhere in the world, central banks in charge
of monetary policy are in dialogue with the governments in charge of the rest of
economic policy. Ignore the parallelism between economic and monetary
matters ... and this could lead to failure.’ It recommends that the European
Council define the broad orientations for EMU and the economic policy of the
Community. Moreover, the draft treaty also argued in favour of giving the
Ecofin
20 the responsibility for exchange rate policy. The French draft treaty
maintained an ambiguity as regards the goal of price stability: it favoured the
primacy of monetary stability, but also gave the European Council and Ecofin a
means to challenge this primacy.
4.2  Italy
4.2.1 Pro-European attitudes
A crucial factor in shaping Italy’s policy on European monetary integration has
been the widespread pro-European attitudes of the Italian national elites as well
as public opinion.
21 The Christian Democrats, who were by far the main
component of each government coalition until the 1992 general elections, and
other parties of the coalition, such as the Republican and Liberal parties,
espoused a European ‘vocation’. In the early 1970s the main opposition party,
the Italian Communist Party also abandoned its hostility towards European
integration (Vannicelli, 1974) and Italy’s European policy became consensual,
at least up to a point
22. From 1973 onwards public opinion support for the EC in
Italy was higher than elsewhere, and remained so throughout the 1990s.
Furthermore, since the creation of the EC, the more ‘enlightened’ and
outward-oriented part of the Italian elite has regarded ‘Europe’ as a way to
                                                    
20 Council of Economic and Finance Ministers.
21 Since the early 1970s Italian public opinion had recognised the benefits deriving
from European integration and by 1973-4 mass support for the EEC in Italy was higher
than anywhere else (Putnam 1978, Eurobarometer 1973, 1974).
22 A word of caution is required.  For example, in 1978 the Italian Communist Party
voted against Italy’s joining the EMS and the Italian Socialist Party abstained. In 1992 the
"Reconstructed Communists" and the Italian Social Movement voted against the
ratification of the TEU.
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develop the Italian economy, to modernise the country and to bring about
domestic reforms. The vision of Europe as a useful ‘external constraint’
(Sbragia, 2001; Dyson and Featherstone 1999)
23 has been an entrenched policy
belief in the mind of many Italian policy-makers. It has also been part and parcel
of the policy beliefs concerning European monetary integration, which, in the
Italian debate, was often considered a synonym for European integration tout
court. The widespread support for European integration has been an important
asset on which certain national policy-makers have relied in tipping certain
domestic policies in the direction they favoured (Sbragia 2001; Quaglia 2002).
4.2.2 A supranational institutionalist approach
A constant feature of the Italian approach to European monetary integration –
and to European integration tout court - has been a supranational and
institutional vision. Already at the time of the Werner Report, Colombo, the
Italian finance minister, was in favour of substantial progress towards EMU.
According to Belgian minutes of the Ecofin meeting of February 23 and 24,
1970, he pleaded for Community institutions that would become responsible for
economic policies and a European Federal Reserve System.
24  ‘Il désire, en effet,
remplacer la coordination des politiques nationales par une véritable mesure
d'unification’  (Note X/CEE/620/34160, 26/2/1970, Archives Snoy, Map
5.3.12.8.2).
Another instance in which the Italian institutionalist approach came to
the fore was the support for the institutional phase of the EMS with the creation
of the EMF in the early 1980s. Throughout the negotiations of the TEU, the
adequacy of the institutional arrangements for the transitional stage to EMU and,
in particular, for the stage two institution, were constant concerns for the Italian
negotiators (Bini Smaghi et al. 1994).
4.2.3 The shift from an ‘economist’ to a ‘monetarist’ approach
At the time of the Werner report, Italian authorities sided with the economist
camp, since they held the view that a condition sine qua non for fixed exchange
rates in Europe was the acceptance of similar economic objectives among
                                                    
23 Italian public opinion has generally supported the process of European integration and
monetary integration was no exception.  In May 2000 a survey concerning the support for
the Single Currency reported that 81 % of Italians supported the Euro and 14 % were
against it.  The EU  15 average was 58  % in favour and 33  % against (Eurobarometer
2000).
24 It is worth noting that the Italian institutionalist approach extended to many spheres of EC
activity.  For instance, Italy supported the creation of common institutional mechanisms,
like the secretariat, at the time of the Single European Act in 1986.20
countries, as governor Carli (1969) argued in a paper prepared for Jean Monnet's
Action Committee for the United States of Europe.
25 In concrete terms, Italian
authorities supported the ‘Schiller plan’, named after the German finance
minister (Ungerer 1997). Italian Treasury Minister Colombo, despite his support
for substantial progress, was close to the Dutch-German position on matters of
procedure and was therefore cautious about the transitory phases. He was
reluctant to the idea of narrowing exchange rate fluctuation margins (Segreto
2002). Kruse (1980: 70) argues that the Italian authorities shared the concern of
the other ‘economists’ about introducing a common currency before a high
degree of economic convergence had been achieved, albeit for different reasons.
As a country with a chronically weak balance of payments, Italy was loath to
enter into commitments that might force the adoption of deflationary measures.
When the EMS was established in 1978, Italian policy-makers, in
particular, the Bank of Italy, espoused economist leanings, pointing out that the
EMS needed some ‘in-built flexibility’ (Baffi, 1989) to take into account Italy’s
‘special conditions’ and that it should contribute to the ‘convergence’ of the
Italian economy without imposing unbearable burdens. In other words, senior
policy-makers at the Banca d'Italia feared that the exchange rate system would
not be supported by sufficiently convergent economic policies. If so, the lira
would have to leave the ERM, as had happened with the snake. Also, in the light
of their experience with the snake, they (unsuccessfully) advocated a more
‘symmetric’ configuration of the EMS (Masera 1987) in terms of interventions
to defend the exchange rate.
From the early 1980s, Italian policy-makers generally sided with the
monetarist group, together with France, Belgium and the Commission.
Furthermore, as time passed, Italian authorities became more outspoken both in
their call for symmetry - Italy was penalised by the asymmetric functioning of
the EMS – and in proposing moves towards EMU. The Amato memorandum in
1988, which pointed out that the fundamental problem of the EMS was the lack
of an ‘engine of growth’  was another way to draw attention to the asymmetric
functioning of the system. The Italian document called for the coordination of
the objectives of the EMS, among which a common policy vis-à-vis third
country currencies with an increased role for the ECU in exchange rate
interventions and the strengthening of the EMCF, which should also serve the
function of reallocating financial funds among the member states. Ultimately,
the EMU was also seen by Italian authorities as a way to address, once and for
all, the asymmetric functioning of the EMS and to have a say in European
monetary policy (Amato 1988; Ciampi 1992).
                                                    
25 Carli, in an article published in Euromoney in 1970 also argued that the creation of a
European currency should be ‘the culminating act of a sequence through which political
and economic unification were achieved’.
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4.3  Comparison
Initially, at the time of the Hague Summit, France and Italy took more or less
opposed positions in the debate on European monetary integration in policy-
makers’ circles. They diverged on the nature of EMU, with Italy in favour of
supranational institutions and France against.  These orientations were directly
related to their views on European integration and state conceptions. They also
favoured different paths towards EMU, with France strongly in favour of
limiting exchange rate fluctuations and monetary support mechanisms and Italy
much more cautious. Furthermore, the international dimension of EMU was
paramount for France, and less so for Italy.













- Economist ('crawling peg' to
adjust for inflation
differences)
- Supranational (support for
European institutions)
EMS 1979 - Symmetry (in favour of
the divergence indicator;
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divergence indicator, EC
credit facilities)
- In-built flexibility (in favour
of wider fluctuation bands)
- Parallel measures for the less
prosperous economies




- Institutionalist (in favour of
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Over time the two positions converged.  In the course of the 1970s, Italy became
more in favour of mechanisms of monetary solidarity.
26 In the 1980s, policy-
makers in both countries regarded European monetary integration as an ‘external
constraint’ and used exchange rate stability -- although to a different extent -- as
a way to enforce domestic discipline. Therefore, European integration was a
way to ‘anchor’ national macroeconomic policies in a European framework and
to bring about domestic reforms. Both countries advocated a monetarist
approach and called for a more symmetric EMS and played an active role in
relaunching the EMU process with the Delors Report and the TEU. For France,
as for Italy, EMU was the way to end the asymmetry, and thus German
dominance of the EMS.  For French policy-makers, however, EMU constituted a
kind of ‘conceptual retreat’ in that they had, gradually, to accept the German
vision of a more supranational EMU with an independent central bank, both
features that were not problematic for the Italian authorities. It should also be
noted that French policy towards EMU was partly driven by political
considerations which were greatly reinforced by German unification.
A main difference between the two countries concerned their positions
on central bank independence. The principle was very controversial for the
French authorities, as it ran so completely counter to the French centralised state
structure and the republican tradition. Central bank independence was, in
principle, not a problem for the Italian authorities. So, as regarding the
‘political’ dimension, the Banca d'Italia was one of the more independent central
banks in the European Union (Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991,
pp. 368-9). However, in Italy, central bank independence was more a ‘practical’
problem, given serious budget deficits  and the associated problems of monetary
financing.
5.  CONCLUSION
This paper analyses the approaches of France and Italy towards  EMU.
Notwithstanding certain similarities and a convergence over time resulting from
the European integration process, it is argued that there were very significant
differences, which, to a large extent, have their origins in the structures and
conceptions of the state in the two countries.
In France, strong and cohesive state institutions dealing with
macroeconomic policies made it easier for French policy-makers to instil
discipline into the national economy, a crucial condition for progress on
European monetary integration. Italy, on the contrary, with its weak political
                                                    
26 Despite its withdrawal from the snake, Italy was one of the major recipients of EC
financial support throughout the 1970s (Ungerer 1997).
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capacity and disjointed macroeconomic institutions was less coherent and less
effective in imposing discipline. The differences in state structure, and the
associated differences in policy beliefs, also affected the views on European
integration, with French policy makers largely in favour of an intergovernmental
approach, while Italian policy makers, instead, supported a more supranational
approach.
For both countries European monetary integration was important, but, in
different ways. In Italy it was primarily seen as an external constraint on
domestic policies, a way to promote reforms that national institutions were not
able to achieve domestically. For France, the international and European power
dimension of EMU was paramount. Overall then, whereas for France it was
politically problematic to accept the principles of a supranational EMU and
central bank independence, for Italy, the main obstacle was economic
convergence.24
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